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E debbasi considerare come non è cosa più difficile a trattare, 
né più dubia a riuscire, né più pericolosa a maneggiare, che 
farsi capo a introdurre nuovi ordini.2
(Niccolò Machiavelli3 c. 1527: Il Principe, VI)
Semiotics of Religion Between Nature and Culture
Religion is a phenomenon to be studied at the crossroad of nature and culture.4 The most general hypothesis of the present essay is that language—conceived as the dimension and the arena in which 
1 This essay is a synthesis of the first part of the conclusions of my two-volume work 
Grammars of Infinity, forthcoming in the series “Semiotics of Religion”, which I co-direct 
at Walter de Gruyter. For a more detailed “map”, please refer to such conclusions, as well 
as to my previously published two-volume work, in Italian, Annunciazioni (Leone 2014a). 
I thank the two anonymous reviewers of the first version of the present essay for their 
valuable suggestions.
2 “And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, 
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the in-
troduction of a new order of things” (Machiavelli c. 1527: trans. William K. Marriott, 1910).
3 Florence, 3 May 1469–1527 June 21.
4 “Nature” and “culture” here must not be understood as monadic counterparts of a 
binary dialectics but rather as polarizations at the extremities of a spectrum, opposing, as 
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innate cognitive abilities become socially shared habits—is the most im-
portant definition of this crossroad. Peirce’s theory of the sign and Eco’s 
interpretation of it are adopted as general frameworks for developing 
such understanding and its consequences, both theoretical and ethical 
(Eco 1976).
In comparison to other species, the human being is endowed with 
cognition of infinity. Evolution has selected a type of mind that is able 
to anticipate changes in the environment by simulating them through 
simulacra. Recursion, a fundamental characteristic of language, multiplies 
the capability of this skill. Human beings can produce potentially infinite 
symbolical worlds through which they navigate the possibilities of trans-
formation in their habitat. Language, however, is not only this tempestuous 
multiplication but also selection. Cognition of infinity is useless, or even 
harmful, without the parallel ability to single out pre-representations that 
best befit the needs of the individual. Such selection, though, does not hap-
pen only individually but also and above all socially. Living together with 
other members of the species means curtailing one’s unbridled imagination 
so as to conform to socially shared codes (Eco 1979). The environment is 
controlled through patterns that become the symbolical treasure of com-
munity and are handed down through culture and tradition. The present 
essay argues that language is the essential faculty through which human 
groups transform the proliferation of individual cognitions of potentiality 
into an actual and socially shared matrix of meaningfulness.5
Among the patterns that language produces in order to create order in 
the human cognition of the world, religion holds a particularly important 
Russian semiotician Jurij M. Lotman would suggest, the “genetic memory of the human 
species” and its “non-genetic memory” (for an instance of such complex and complexifying 
thinking of nature and culture, see the classic essay “No Nature, No Culture: the Hagen 
Case” by British anthropologist Marilyn Strathern [1980]); religion is not handed down 
from generation to generation through the human genetic code; hence, it is a cultural 
matter; yet, its anthropological rationale stems from a condition that is rooted in the 
biological nature of the human species as well as in its relation with the environment; 
current anthropology trends, however, suggest that this relation changes depending on 
the nature of the environment, giving rise to different “ontological ideologies” of nature 
(see the work of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro).
5 By “meaningfulness” here is meant the capacity of transforming an entity, that is, 
an aspect of reality, from mere “thing”, that is, matter bereft of language and, therefore, 
mute to existence, into a “sign”, that is, something that is potentially endowed with the 
ability to trigger a semiotic process, and to refer to something else across the meshes of 
culture. Nature by itself cannot be meaningful; it merely is; only its being “spoken” by 
language turns it into something that “exists”, that emerges from voiceless ontology into 
the dimension of semiotics.
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place.6 It is, indeed, a sort of meta-reflexive pattern, meaning that it is the 
cultural matrix through which human beings seek to bestow meaning-
fulness upon the mechanism itself of meaningfulness. In other words, 
religion7 is the cultural pattern, produced by human cognition’s access to 
infinity, in relation to which this same access is accounted for. Paradox is 
often a central element of religious cultures and traditions exactly because 
they prominently long for a finite representation of infinitude. They aim 
at producing and preserving codified habits of interpretation, whose main 
claim is nonetheless that of escaping codification itself. Religion is a static 
and actual matrix of signs whose ambition is to meaningfully pattern the 
matrix itself, as well as its principle of generation. In religion, human 
beings are constantly within finitude—because they must abide by the 
shared codes of a religious community—but simultaneously they are also 
constantly in relation with infinitude, for that which they are promised is 
intrinsically a harmonious account of their own cognitive and emotional 
access to endlessness. If I can imagine an infinite world, why should I end? 
That is the question that most religions seek to answer, providing stable 
and socially endorsed simulacra of the interplay between boundlessness 
and finitude.8
6 Religion is not exactly language, and language is not exactly religion, but the essay 
contends that many of the human manifestations that commonly go under the imprecise 
label of “religion” could be better understood if seen as a byproduct of language. Further-
more, the disciplines that study language provide a robust intersubjective framework for 
the scientific analysis of religious phenomena.
7 The essay designates by “religion”, in the singular form, the abstract anthropological 
dimension that gives rise to the religious phenomenon at the crossroad of nature and cul-
ture; it designates as “religions”, in the plural form, the cultural and historical configurations 
to which this dimension gives rise across space and time (including not only theologically 
systematic patterns as conceived in “orthodox” systems but comprising, more broadly, 
both religious systems that are organized, mainstream, and state-sponsored (textual/
scriptural, “orthodox”) and those that are local “traditional” indigenous religious systems 
outside them. The relation between “religion” and “religions” is analogous to that which 
holds between “language” as an anthropological and cognitive faculty of human beings 
and “languages” as contingent manifestations of such faculty. “Religions” might emerge 
and disappear, whereas “religion” accompanies the entire adventure of homo sapiens.
8 Claiming that religions are “static” does mean that they do not change; on the con-
trary, since they arise from the relation between human cognition and the environment, 
they change as the natural, and subsequently the cultural, environment changes; what is 
meant here by “static” is, on the contrary, the tendency of religions to structure themselves 
as stable and stabilizing matrixes, whose change is planned and maintained at a slower pace 
than the cognitive change of both the religious community members and their genera-
tions; religions might indeed change during the lifespan of a member; but that would be 
unusual, and is mostly a feature of epochs, like the present one, characterized by increas-
ing technological speed. Across human history, instead, religions provide a framework of 
(apparently) immobile reference rather than a vector for cultural modification. They are 
rather an agent of social stabilization within a group than an agent of group dynamization. 
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The Tasks of Semiotics of Religion
If language is the faculty through which human beings both access infinity 
and regiment it, and if religion is the series of meta-reflexive simulacra 
through which human beings share accounts of their own relation to the 
paradox of finitude and infinity, then the task of semiotics of religion is 
twofold. On the one hand, it involves investigating the morphology of pat-
terns that human groups elaborate so as to codify the religious dimension. 
These patterns are not only verbal but involve all kinds of signs, since the 
faculty of language consists in patterning the world through both verbal 
and non-verbal expressive substances. Verbal language, however, holds a 
privileged status in the religious patterning of the world, for it is precisely 
in verbal language that the property of recursion finds expression (Yelle 
2013b). The environment besieges all the senses of the sentient being, so 
that patterns stemming from all these senses seek to made the environment 
intelligible in terms of present perceptions, memory of past perceptions, 
and anticipations of future perceptions. Nevertheless, it is only in verbal 
language that grids of comprehension can be mentally manipulated so 
as to produce infinite chains of words and thoughts. Human beings may 
also abandon themselves to the endless reverie of visual internal thought; 
and yet it is only verbal internal thought that carries both the flavor of 
infinity and the preciseness of finitude. I can structure a grammatically 
perfect sentence and yet simultaneously open it to infinite but patterned 
expansion. Perhaps only in music human beings experience the same 
paradoxical relation between codification and infinitude.
The present essay argues that the semiotics of religion must not confine 
itself to studying the multifarious ways in which the faculty of language 
gives rise to religious patterns of codification and meaningfulness but also, 
conversely, the even more mysterious ways in which religious ideologies 
influence the conception of meaning. From this point of view, the usual 
sociological conception of “secularization” proves totally inadequate: 
although a human group might consciously expel religious representa-
tions from its semiosphere, the way in which this semiosphere produces 
“Revolutionary” religions exist (and even Christianity was one of them at its onset), yet 
they inevitably tend to crystallize into stable forms, exactly because they must serve the 
purpose of acting as cultural matrixes allowing the transmission of non-genetic content 
across generations; from this point of view, religions evolve exactly as languages, meaning 
that they do change but without ever jeopardizing, because of the excessive speed of such 
change, their role of bestowing a grid of semiotic intelligibility and social cohesiveness to 
a community. A community in which the spoken language changes all the time could not 
survive; in the same way, a religious community in which, for instance, liturgy changes 
continuously could not subsist.
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and structures meaning is constantly affected by deep-seated religious 
ideologies9 which condition the conception of value in-depth. A further 
paradox the semiotics of religion must deal with is that language is the 
faculty that brings about the patterning that we call “religion”, but such 
patterning in its turn bestows a distinctive quality upon the faculty itself 
of language. Religion is a byproduct of the cognitive faculty of language, 
but the faculty of language too paradoxically is a cultural byproduct of 
the socially shared ideology of religion that a community has selected as 
its own throughout history. As a consequence, the theoretical effort of se-
miotics of religion must be twofold as well: on the one hand, the semiotic 
analysis of religious codes; on the other hand, the semiotically inspired 
religious philosophy of language.
The Semiotic Maze of Religion
Conceiving religions as cultural patterns that simply constrain the other-
wise unbridled human access to potentiality through socially shared 
habits would be limiting. Religions, indeed, do not simply pattern infini-
tude. They seek to paradoxically produce finite simulacra of infinitude. 
Such oxymoronic effort often gives rise to “fractal patterns”, that is, cul-
tural patterns whose morphology reproduces in scale that of the semiotic 
mechanisms that have produced it. That is a general hypothesis in Russian 
semiotician Jurij M. Lotman’s understanding of the universe of meaning 
as semiosphere (Lotman 1990). Cultures produce within themselves texts 
and other symbolical artifacts, whose distinctive quality is to represent in 
scale, as in topological fractals, the whole of which they are part, as well 
as its internal dynamics (Leone 2018).
Religious matrixes of meaningfulness also feature this characteristic. 
Their fractals, however, are somehow unique in representing both prolif-
eration of potentiality and the ability of a religious tradition to order it. 
Hence, the maze is a fundamental topological diagram of most religions 
9 As much as this goal is attainable, the present essay wishes to adopt a “non-ide-
ological” acceptance of the word “ideology”; indeed, this term is not meant here in the 
political, ethical, teleological, or even more broadly, axiological sense, but rather in line 
with the technical meaning of “linguistic ideology” and “semiotic ideology”, respectively 
in linguistic and semiotic anthropology; an ideology is, therefore, the set of implicit and 
explicit meta-rules through which meaning is framed in a community; a religious ideol-
ogy is such not because it is ethically partial but because it is semiotically thus, meaning 
that an alternative meta-framing of the religious dimension might be possible and even 
find actualization in another temporal or spatial setting. For instance, Christianity is a 
“religious ideology” not because it is false (such characterization might be of interest for 
logicians, not for semioticians), but because an alternative meta-framing of transcendence 
is possible in human anthropology and history.
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(Wallace 2003). Also, amazement is perhaps the most cross-culturally 
typical sentiment associated with religion. In religion, believers must 
find the maze, amazement when they are confronted with it, and relief 
in the complex orderliness through which religious codes guide amazed 
awareness through the maze. The peculiar perspective of semiotics and its 
essential divergence from the emic point of view of religions consists in 
pointing out that religious traditions do not simply provide the diagram 
through which believers can disentangle themselves from the maze. Re-
ligions also provide believers with the maze itself. They construct both a 
simulacrum of awe-inspiring infinity, and a socially shared symbolical 
map of the labyrinth. In religion, believers constantly switch between the 
subjective and the aerial view of the maze, through paradoxical stereo-
scopy (Leone 2016).
Semiotic Models of Revelation
Semiotics of religion must both capture the general dynamics through 
which human beings make sense of their environment through religious 
patterns of codification and articulate the specificities of these patterns, 
starting from abstract alternatives. In defining the abovementioned stereo-
scopic dialectics of maze and solution, religious cultures may adopt one 
of two very general options: on the one hand—in transcendent models of 
revelation—imagining that both the awe-inspiring intricacy of the maze 
and its humbling solution emanate from an agency that is situated outside 
of the maze itself, in a “beyond” whose separation from the believer’s 
own experience can be bridged only by incontrollable revelation. In such 
grammars of infinity, a divided ontology comes about, which subsequently 
affects a society’s entire ideology of meaning. Human communities that 
have embraced this kind of grammar of infinity often end up observing its 
topology even after or through secularization. In cultures dominated by 
models of transcendent revelation, indeed, significant agency and relevant 
meaning are always to be looked for in a “beyond”, which is accessible 
to humans only thanks to the gratuitous initiative of an incontrollable 
agency.10 An alternative macro-model of revelation does not entail any 
split between two separate ontological dimensions. The maze and its 
solution are both on the same ontological level; no gratuitous initiative 
from an elsewhere must bridge interrupted communication between the 
awe-struck believer and the guiding deity. In this kind of immanent rev-
elation, it is upon believers to both possess and hand down to subsequent 
10 Without forgetting the roles of mediums and prophets; see Leone 2009.
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generations knowledge and sensibility that are necessary to detect signs 
of religious revelation in the environment itself.
This model impregnates most religious traditions that grew and were 
preserved in inextricable relation with a local territory, whereas models 
of transcendent revelation are rather typical of grammars of infinity 
that successfully travelled across geographic and ethnic frontiers. In 
the latter macro-model, believers receive from a “beyond” the ability to 
meaningfully “read” their relation with infinity; in the former, believers 
gain this ability from scrupulous observation and deciphering of their 
own phenomenological dimension, without any involvement of a tran-
scendent anthropomorphic agency. The most complicated aspect of this 
articulation is that the two models often blur, as it is the case in many 
instances of cultural encounter and cross-fertilization (Leone 2015). The 
post-modern conception of “artistic inspiration” in cultures dominated by 
the macro-model of transcendent revelation, for instance, often resorts to 
the opposite model so as to found and justify the artist’s claim of being able 
to “detect the exoteric message of nature” and becoming the “conscience 
of the sacredness of landscape”. Symmetrically, religious cultures in which 
immanent models of revelation prevail can be revolutionized by contact 
with the opposite model, as it was the case in many instances of mission-
ary proselytizing. Upon embracing the missionary’s religious ideology, 
members of a culture of “immanent revelation” accept that their ontology 
suddenly splits into two dimensions, separated by a gap that only alien 
religious technique, in opposition to traditional knowledge, can bridge.
Semiotic Models of Mediation
Ideally, the semiotics of religion should elaborate increasingly thick articu-
lations of these two general options and their interconnections. In both 
models, a further dialectics must be introduced between immediacy and 
mediation. Religions, indeed, can vary as regards the degree of human 
subjectivity that they attribute to the agency of revelation. On the one hand, 
revelation can take place without the intervention of any mediating figure. 
On the other hand, mediation of a subject or group, usually endowed with 
some sort of technical knowledge and specific language, must intervene. 
This dichotomy does not overlap at all with the one described above. In 
both immanent and transcendent models of revelation, indeed, disclosure 
of the maze and appeasement of frightening amazement before infinitude 
can either be the exclusive responsibility of the subject or entail cooperation 
from hierarchically superior orders of knowledge. In transcendent revela-
tion, believers can either be encouraged to conceive access to infinitude as 
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result of direct contact with the deity or as consequence of their merging 
into a community led by specific religious leaders and mediators. Similarly, 
in immanent revelation, reality can either “speak” openly to its native ob-
servers or through intermediation of “experts” (such in certain forms of 
“immanent divination”).11
This second dichotomy is extremely interesting for the semiotics of 
religion, since it gives rise to divergent semiotic ideologies of the religious 
sign. Religious communities and their traditions can either accept complex 
forms of symbolical intermediation between the source of revelation and 
its receivers or they might strive to purify the message of the deity from 
any added interference (Yelle 2003). Most of the fiercest contrapositions 
in the history of religions can be traced back to this dialectics between 
mediation and immediacy, between willingness to accept that revelation is 
possible only through signs and the utopia to overcome signification so as 
to grasp the totality of infinitude (Leone 2014d; Leone et al., Forthcoming).
Semiotics of Religious Law
Religious ideologies of mediation / immediacy affect a society’s entire 
symbolical framework and set the standards of imagined perfection in 
every field of human activity. In no sphere this influence is more percep-
tible than in the domain of law (Jackson 1985). When human beings seek 
to codify licit and illicit patterns of behavior, they usually do so through 
positing a specific topology between the sources of law and its provisions. 
In legal cultures influenced by religious ideologies of immediacy, inter-
mediation between the source and the target of law is seen as superfluous 
or mechanical: the religious/legal leader is nothing but a human chain in 
the transmission of revelation.
On the opposite, legal cultures that are under the influence of a re-
ligious ideology of mediation stress the opaqueness of all transmission 
and introduce the necessity of technical hermeneutics. Such divergence 
concerns not only the agency but also the materiality of immediacy/
mediation. On the one hand, communities pursue utopian transparency: 
language can be thinned down to a mere film, which impalpably adapts 
to reality without adding any extra color or shape. On the other hand, 
communities beware such utopia of diaphanousness, considering that the 
polluting artificiality of language is at work everywhere and surreptitiously 
so in all dreams of legal immediacy (Leone et al. 2018).
11 Complex contextual factors can lead towards either of the two polarizations, de-
pending on a dialectics that can also be read as a further instantiation of the one between 
pre-modernity and modernity (without, however, overlapping with it); cfr. Faubion 2001.
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Semiotics of Religious Subjectivity
The semiotic focus on signs should not lead to the conclusion that ide-
ologies of immanent/transcendent revelation and immediacy/mediation 
only influence the exteriority of communication. Subjectivity itself, meant 
as the nexus where the linguistic faculty finds its center and the point of 
intersection between infinity and finitude, is shaped according to a topol-
ogy that obeys socially shared paradigms of interiority. Such paradigms 
might be difficult to detect, for they are naturalized as habits even more 
than coded “external” patterns of communication are. And yet, as Rus-
sian semiotician Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin first suggested, internal 
communication too is shaped by culture (Bakhtin 1975).
That is evident not only to psychologists but also to those who, be 
they cultural historians or semioticians, survey and analyze the figures of 
religious interiority and subjectivity that a religious culture has produced 
and held as central throughout its development. In Christianity, none of 
these figures is more important than that of the soul. Studying its both 
verbal and iconic representations shows how the abovementioned dialectic 
has molded this receptacle according to a precise topology, which itself 
results from a specific religious and, therefore, ontological imagination 
(Leone 2013).
Semiotics of Religious Conversion
It is not an accident that conversion has been forbidden and still is prohib-
ited in many religious communities, stigmatized as apostasy and punished 
severely, sometimes even by death. Religious conversion, indeed, bares the 
consubstantial fragility of all human grammars of infinity. Such fragility 
is mostly invisible from an internal point of view, carefully concealed by 
a thick apparatus of signs, liturgies, and hierarchies. Believers must hold 
the certainty that no alternative to their own pattern of meaningfulness 
can better grasp the relation to infinity. Yet, not only are these coded and 
socially shared patterns constantly open to mostly accidental micro-
variations (which in the long term deform and turn them into different 
diachronic varieties of the same grammar); grammars of infinity can also 
be irremediably shaken by the earthquake of conversion. In converting, 
believers implicitly state that their former system of beliefs12 was, contrary 
12 By “belief ” the present essay means the cognitive, emotional, and pragmatic ad-
hesion to a mental representation that is considered as not having possible alternatives, 
although such alternatives de facto exist from an external semiotic point of view. One 
cannot be properly say to “believe in the current measure of the speed of light”, since 
no alternative measurements seem to be possible within the community of interpreters 
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to their previous assumption, artificial. They intrinsically affirm that a 
better grammar is possible (Leone 2014b).
The paradox of this turning point is that, after conversion, naturaliza-
tion of the newly adopted religious habits is exceedingly difficult. It is not 
rare that the convert converts again. However, it is even more common that 
the new convert becomes a radical and a fundamentalist, exactly because 
she or he has to prove both to the community and to her- or himself that 
the newly embraced patterns of religious articulation of the world are the 
“natural” ones (Leone 2004). Hence, religious conversion witnesses to the 
precariousness of every human symbolical capture of infinity; at the same 
time, it constitutes a tribute to the human access to potentiality. If human 
beings can convert, it is exactly because they can spontaneously, albeit 
painstakingly, return to the matrix of potentiality that precedes adoption 
of a crystallized system of belief. During the asymptotic instant that marks 
the passage from the old religion to the new one—entailing a conversion 
of the soul as well as of all the signs through which its religious predica-
ment finds expression—the self is restructured through relation with the 
openness of infinitude. Converting is reopening the ebullient receptacle 
of human freedom.
Semiotics of Religious Meta-change
The richest way to interpret the theoretical mission of semiotics is to 
envisage a continuous multiplication of meta-levels of analysis.13 That is 
certainly the case for religious conversion. At one level, as it was affirmed 
earlier, it is true that religious conversion signals the mutable nature of 
religious grammars, communities, and above all, selves. Religious con-
version is so intensely hated and so severely reprimanded by religious 
leaders precisely for it points at the potential inconsistency of their tenets. 
At a superior level of abstraction, however, the semiotician should give 
that credits such measure, that is, the present-day community of scientists, yet one can 
properly say to believe in the “immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary”, for alternative 
theological views of this dogma are indeed possible and have, actually, been endorsed by 
minorities within the same hermeneutic community. 
13 These levels, however, would require attention to the socio-cultural context as 
well as a series of relevant examples and/or citations. Peirce himself, after all, advocated 
an inclusion of the social as well as the sign in semiotic analysis. Yet, the present essay is 
meant to provide a map; no one-to-one map, as Borges famously observed in his short 
story “On Exactitude in Science” [original Spanish title: “Del rigor en la ciencia”] (1946), 
would be useful. Thus, the map presented in the present essay is not the territory but a 
diagram of it, necessarily schematizing the former through the bias of the latter’s disciplin-
ary perspective; it ambitions to guide future semioticians of religion in their empirical and 
also theoretical explorations through the marvelously multifarious domain of religion.
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up the idea that the notion of “religious conversion” itself might be an 
unshakable cornerstone from whose vantage point the malleability of 
human beliefs can be gauged. Indeed, the mutability of language through 
the history of human interactions is such that the phenomenology itself 
of religious conversion changes across different religious cultures and, 
even more surprisingly, across different epochs of the “same” religion. As 
philological investigation can demonstrate, converting today is not the 
same as converting in antiquity or in early modernity. We have, as Frank 
Kermode used to say, “changed our views on change” (Kermode 2004).
To give an example, there is a period in the history of many religious 
communities in which converting as individuals is unthinkable, not only 
because it would entail lethal consequences (that is the case also in many 
present-day religious groups), but also and above all because the idea of 
a singular soul, detached from the “soul” of the community, has not been 
developed. Converting in these circumstances would mean following and 
imitating the spiritual change of the leader or else becoming the leader of 
a new religious community. In these circumstances, the modern idea of 
experiencing religious conversion individually, in contrast with the sur-
rounding community or in the anonymity of the plural city, is not included 
among the “meta-habits” of human religious behavior.
Semiotics of Religious Temptation
The mutability of language and its forms, in every expressive substance, 
is a great strength. It allows individuals and communities to adapt to a 
constantly changing environment. As it was hypothesized since the be-
ginning of this essay, the human ability of elaborating infinite simulacra 
of potential worlds endowed the species with an extraordinary gift for 
forecasting and adaptation. As the environment of the species became less 
and less a “natural” one and more and more one constituted by traces of 
past cognitive activity of the same human species, the adaptive character 
of the human access to infinite potentiality turned more complex and, at 
times, paradoxical. The cultural environment produced by human cog-
nition does not select human simulacra in the same ways as the natural 
environment does. The ways in which culture privileges some ideas and 
reproduces them generation after generation through tradition are not 
clear, as it is not clear at all whether these ways might be adaptive or not. 
Pessimists could even argue that the unresponsiveness of human ideas to 
the natural environment is exactly that which is turning the human spe-
cies into a self- and environment-destructive one (Leone, Forthcoming).
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Nevertheless, against this pessimist view, it can be contended that, 
even in a predominantly cultural environment, the ability to create, store, 
and hand down infinite representations of it will constitute, in the end, an 
extraordinary resource for saving both the species and its environment. 
That does not rule out that the mutability of language is, for most human 
beings, frightening. The capacity for mentally accessing ever-changing 
representations of the environment without any tetragonal stability is 
a source of anxiety. Semiotic habits are the natural social response to it. 
Through habits, human beings experience language as stability, as matrix 
of patterns that bestow intelligibility upon the world and allow the coordi-
nation of individual and social agencies (Eco 1984). The appeasing allure 
of habits is such that communities of human beings might sometimes 
interpret the inextirpable mutability of language as a source of evil. That 
is evident in the spectacular manifestation of such mutability that is, as 
suggested earlier, religious conversion. Nevertheless, in many cases, not 
only the disrupting phenomenon of conversion but also the microscopic 
and subtle variations that language constantly injects into patterned habits 
of meaningfulness, comprehension, and behavior might turn unbearable. 
In these cases, the human anxious longing for stability becomes phobia 
rejecting every form of change and every change of form. That which is 
a force of language, that is, its untamable exuberance, is seen as danger 
and constrained into more and more rigid forms, meant to thwart any 
individual ebullience in favor of the petrified stability of the community. 
The religious figure of temptation, common in many religious cultures 
and traditions, exemplifies such instinct at its best: resisting temptation 
abstractly means negating the impulse of the force so as to exclude it from 
the existent pattern, from the form that traditionally shapes meaning in 
the community or in the obedient self.
Semiotics of Religious Ecstasy
The theoretical counterpart of temptation, therefore, is not sanctity but 
ecstasy. It is in ecstasy, indeed, a state that many religions or religious 
currents dream about, that the faculty of language produces paradoxi-
cal simulacra, whose main content is that of representing a prodigious 
escaping from this faculty itself and, hence, a return to the totality of 
infinite potentiality. Religious fundamentalism too consists in the utopia 
of paralyzing the proliferation of semiosis into a single, definitive set of 
habits (Leone 2014c). Fundamentalism, however, is not ecstatic; it does 
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not long for the preservation of totality into singularity, of infinite into 
finitude. It simply carries on a politics of exclusion.14
The great mystics of all time and religions were, on the contrary, mas-
ters of inclusion. They were after the impossible word that simultaneously 
captures the source of meaning and let it flow, unrestrained (Certeau 1982). 
That is why ecstasy is the opposite of temptation: it conceives of every 
initiative of the force of semiosis as holy and as worthy of being included 
in the complexity of forms. Ecstasy does not resist any temptation but 
welcomes the apparently irrational gush of meaning by designing open, 
paradoxical, and oxymoronic forms, able to host both a simulacrum of 
transcendence and its opposite; to contain transcendence as totality with 
no exclusion and no fear of contradictions. That is precisely the reason for 
which orthodoxy usually fears ecstasy, for its openness to infinity contrasts 
with any fundamentalism but also blurs any distinction between good and 
evil, morality and immorality, meaningfulness and meaninglessness, and 
even orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Opening the form of semiosis to infinity 
means disclosing its tranquil habits to turbulent contradiction.
Semiotics of Religious Expression
Unlike other trends in philosophy of religion, a semiotically inspired 
philosophy of religious language does not elaborate its theoretical views 
abstractedly but on the basis of analytical and empirical observation.15 
14 That is, a politics aiming at creating new divisions, and potentially violent conflict, 
within an existing community of interpreters.
15 The semiotics of religion therefore elaborates a theoretical and analytical space of 
dialogue, confrontation, and complementarity between the long tradition of philosophy 
of religion, which tends to sacrifices the details of empirical observation for the sake of 
encompassing them into a broad and abstract view of the religious phenomenon, and the 
equally long tradition of anthropology of religion, which, conversely, often neglects the 
wide picture for the sake of focusing on empirical peculiarities; theoretically-inspired 
anthropologists like Geertz, then, constitute the privileged interlocutors, within the an-
thropological field, of semiotics; similarly, empirically-bound philosophers of religion, 
like Otto, ideally complement the perspective of semiotics of religion in the fields of 
theology, history, and philosophy of religion. The theoretical framework provided by the 
semiotic understanding of religion also affects the analytical work, in which religious 
phenomena and manifestations are meant to be observed not directly through suppos-
edly unstructured participant observation but through the lenses offered by the notions of 
language, discourse, textuality, and narrativity; it is only by framing the direct observation 
of religious occurrences (which include not only rituals and practices, but also documents 
and artifacts) within such linguistically and semiotically inspired context that the qualia 
under observation and analysis can give rise to an inter-subjective scrutiny. Semiotics 
shuns both the unpatterned subjectivity of impressionistic ethnography and the positivist 
illusion of quantitative approaches to religion (like in certain trends of bio-anthropology, 
for instance).
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For instance, it is through reading verbal accounts of religious ecstasy or 
through observing visual or liturgical settings for ecstatic experience that 
the semiotician can come up with a phenomenological hypothesis about 
what ecstasy is in theoretical terms. More generally, the “core business” of 
semiotics of religion is precisely the collection, observation, and analysis 
of signs through which human beings partake in the religious experi-
ence of a community (Eco 2008). Theoretical systematization of abstract 
models of religious phenomenology and specific analysis of concrete pat-
terns of religious meaningfulness are not separated. The religious ideal 
of a community is substantiated through choice of specific modalities of 
signification and communication. Preferring certain types of signs, texts, 
and codes and giving priority to certain modalities of their reading, inter-
pretation, memory, and transmission is underlain by and simultaneously 
underpins a specific religious ideology. Semiotics can help understanding 
this relation by proposing a technical categorization of signifying means.
The fact that a religious community excludes icons or indexes or 
symbols or various combinations of these three categories of signs from 
its repertoire of admissible religious signs stems from the religious, onto-
logical, and, therefore, semiotic ideology of the community and influences 
every form of semiosis thereon, as well as the entire cultural life of the 
community itself. Even in the so-called “secular” society, the circulation 
of signs is still conditioned by ancient religious biases, or at least is under 
the influence of an overarching semiotic ideology, molding every form 
of signification/communication in a given community. One might even 
argue that there are no secular societies but only, at the most, “secularized” 
societies, that is, societies that seek to become aware and to control, at 
least to a certain extent, the religious biases that underpin it.
Furthermore, one might also argue, more abstractedly, that a commu-
nity is defined exactly by the semiotic ideology that it endorses and turns 
into a communitarian “second nature”. More than language, and even more 
than ethnical belonging, it is semiotic belonging that marks the relation of 
an individual to its community. Belonging to a religious or post-religious 
community means producing, reading, interpreting, and transmitting signs 
as the semiotic ideology of that community prescribes. Being a Christian, 
for instance, means assuming as “natural” that transcendence reveals itself 
through a human-like face and a human-like body. More abstractedly, it 
also means conceiving the gap between here and “beyond”, between im-
manence and transcendence, as a gap that iconic and indexical signs can 
bridge. In Catholicism, one is entitled to behold simulacra that resemble 
and have touched the sacred. That conditions in-depth not only the attitude 
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of believers toward religion but also many other spheres of social life, if not 
all of them. Relation to power and charisma, for instance, are conceived 
in a parallel way: citizens can be touched by power and power can aurati-
cally manifest itself amidst citizens as both face and body. Veneration of 
the “relics of political power” is molded after the semiotic ideology of 
religious worship.
Semiotics of Religious Proselytizing
Overlooking the subtle relation between religious semiotic ideologies and 
production and circulation of specific signs leads to the misinterpreta-
tion of some of the most significant phenomena in the human history of 
religions. As suggested earlier, semiotic ideologies are both influenced by 
and influence religious grammars of infinity in a circularity that is often 
difficult to disentangle. The shape of signs in a religious community obeys 
some usually non-written laws and habits concerning the way in which 
transcendent meaningfulness manifests itself to members of the commu-
nity. The “expansion” of religious community through active proselytizing 
is, from this point of view, extremely relevant.
In historical episodes of this kind, such as early modern Catholic mis-
sions in Mesoamerica or in East Asia, transmission of content is perhaps 
not as important as circulation, “contamination”, blurring, and even ex-
change of semiotic ideologies.16 On the one hand, the religious conversion 
of entire human groups was possible only because it was somehow also a 
“conversion of conversion”. History has mostly focused on how Catholic 
missionaries forced some religious tenets on the natives of distant lands, 
but this righteous zeal for justice often neglected to observe that mission-
aries too were, in a certain way, converted. So as to have their semantic 
contents penetrate in the semiosphere of natives, they had to adopt foreign 
semiotic ideologies, which eventually deeply transformed not only the 
transmission but contents themselves. In its being handed across barri-
ers separating different semiotic ideologies, religious tradition changed 
to the point of becoming an illusory simulacrum of itself. Moreover, the 
same semiotic ideology of Christianity, not only in Mexico but also in 
Rome, was deeply affected by this encounter and reciprocal transforma-
tion of semiotic ideologies. Plenty of historical evidence shows that the 
missionary attempt at adopting new signs and, above all, new forms of 
16 Christian pantheons never remain untouched by semiotic translation of meanings, 
and are profoundly affected by political and social transformations brought by missioniza-
tion and colonization. See the classic studies by Comaroff and Comaroff 1991 and Todorov 
1982.
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semiosis in order to expand the domain of Christianity eventually led to 
deep change in the semiotic orthodoxy of Christianity itself. The mar-
ginalization of verbal language in missionary proselytizing, for instance, 
ended up empowering non-verbal communication also in linguistically 
traditional pastoral environments, such as the “internal missions” of the 
early modern Catholic Church (Leone 2010).
Even more importantly, missionary zeal can also sometimes backfire 
in a different way. Proselytizing implicitly means betting on the human 
predisposition to change and on the malleability of “the soul” as receptacle 
of religious tenets. The one who seeks to convert is implicitly affirming 
that he or she too can be converted. Therefore, in historical contexts too, 
missionaries and “missioned ones” are always configuring the possibility of 
an exchange that only power and coercion keep flowing uni-directionally. 
That which troubles in missions, indeed, is not the willingness of chang-
ing the other, which is implicitly willingness to be changed by the other, 
but the grid of power devices that artificially keep this potentially mutual 
transformation always flowing along one vector only.
Semiotics of Prayer
A semiotically inspired cultural history of religions can realize that the 
most difficult form of conversion does not concern the actual beliefs of a 
religious community but its semiotic ideology. In many cases, for instance, 
Christian proselytizing was successful exactly because it focused on the 
former conversion rather than on the latter. It accepted that the material-
ity of religious semiosis was indifferent in relation to the contents that it 
signified. This assumption itself, however, stemmed from the biases of a 
specific semiotic ideology, according to which content is somehow im-
permeable to expression. But is it, really? And is it thus in every cultural 
and semiotic context? When the Christian pantheon finds expression in 
local systems of signification, does it remain untouched by such semiotic 
translation? That is a thorny issue, debated not only in missionary theol-
ogy but also within most religious communities, even those that are not 
openly keen on proselytizing.
To what extent, for instance, can the language of prayer be dispossessed 
of its exteriority, simplified to the point of turning into pure intentional-
ity of worship, and remain nevertheless effective as means of community 
symbolism (Yelle 2013a)? Many religious traditions feature a trend at intel-
lectualization, whose goal is to downplay the importance of the exteriority 
of signs in favor of the interior earnestness of their content. What matters, 
in these trends, is that which is said or, better, that which is thought, more 
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than the specific words through which this happens. There is a certain 
overlapping of the dialectics between immediacy and mediation, already 
exposed above, with the dialectics between immateriality and materiality, 
arbitrariness and motivation, interiority and exteriority, and individual-
ity and collectivity. Such superimposition of dialectics can be detected in 
most religious traditions, for it captures an ontological dilemma of human 
beings. On the one hand, signs are irremediably necessary to experience 
transcendence through and within the community. Silent prayer can be 
shared, but in such case silence itself becomes a socially partaken, albeit 
paradoxical, habit of communication, subject to certain regularities, rules, 
schemes of (non-) communicative behavior, etc. On the other hand, infin-
ity that translates into signs inevitably loses its character of spontaneity 
and takes on a connotation of artificiality and robotic bigotry. The history 
of the semiotic ideologies of prayer is mainly the history of a struggle be-
tween utopia of an a-semiotic appeal to transcendence and necessity of its 
coagulating into inevitably disappointing habits of religious signification 
and communication.
Semiotics of Ritual
One of the biggest conundrums in cultural history is the rationale (if any) 
according to which communities change their habits. That is the case for 
the cultural history of religion too. Change can happen at the micro-level 
of the specific form that the community adopts to perform a certain liturgy 
or at superior levels of generality and abstraction. In certain circumstances, 
an entire community can decide to convert or to abandon all system of 
explicitly religious ideas. As stressed earlier, converting to a new religion or 
abandoning a system of religious habits is much easier—because it is more 
superficial—than overthrowing a semiotic ideology. Semiotic ideologies 
too, however, change, although usually over longer periods of history; and 
it is even more puzzling to understand the grounds for such mutation. 
One could argue that finding rationality in the transformation of religious 
patterns is as meaningful as seeking to explain not only how, but also 
why language, meant as verbal language, changes. Why do communities 
constantly alter the way in which they communicate? On a mechanical 
level, it can be argued that micro-interactions among speakers, as well as 
micro-interactions among believers, imperceptibly introduce change in 
the socially shared habits of both speaking and praying (Lotman 1992).
That does not explain, however, why some of these variations success-
fully conquer the center of the community’s semiosphere and why other 
idiosyncrasies remain such or are even chastised as potential heresy (or 
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mistakes, in the case of verbal language). Why is subjunctive disappearing 
from spoken Italian and why is Latin being progressively marginalized 
as a means of communication within the Catholic community? As sug-
gested earlier, it is impossible to explain such micro-changes, leading to 
macroevolutions, in terms of adaptation. It is hard to hypothesize that 
a certain way of praying, for instance, allows the community to hold a 
more befitting relation with the natural environment. Research seeking 
to prove the opposite has mostly turned out to be scientifically irrelevant. 
There is, however, the possibility to rethink adaptation in terms of cultural 
resilience. At each moment in its evolution, a community seems to favor 
cultural forms that best befit the self-maintenance of the community’s se-
miosphere, as well as the coordination of agencies within the community. 
That might be the case for religion too: communities tend to select those 
“grammars of infinity” that better allow believers to bestow meaningful-
ness not only upon their natural environment but also and above all upon 
their “second natural environment”, that which they have progressively 
shaped around themselves through both intentional and non-intentional 
adoption of interpretive habits.
Semiotics of Liturgy
In many cases, the evolution of liturgies can be compared to that of 
grammars. Religious communities continuously explore, through micro-
variations concerning small groups or even individuals, alternative ways 
of signifying transcendence. At the same time, they progressively select 
some of these varieties and codify them into a canonical form of praying, 
worshipping, and representing transcendence. Liturgy is, stricto sensu, the 
grammar regulating the collegiality of worshipping during ceremonial 
occasions; lato sensu, though, liturgy designates, from its etymology, the 
“working in common” of the community, the series of codes that allow 
individual semiotic energies to coordinate into a collective agency. Unsuc-
cessful varieties are discarded and, in most cases, condemned together 
with their proposers, whereas successful alternatives make it into the stable 
grammar of infinity adopted by the community.
Although, as it was pointed out earlier, it is difficult to identify con-
textual conditions that determine certain forms to prevail, comparative 
research, nevertheless, leads to single out cross-cultural religious forms, 
which might therefore respond, despite the wide internal variety of their 
codes, to common anthropological and cultural needs. One of such cross-
cultural needs, for instance, is that of either displacing the simulacrum 
of transcendence across space (processions) or to have believers move 
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across space toward a distant simulacrum of transcendence (pilgrimage) 
(Padoan, Forthcoming). In both cases, the spatial movement of either the 
simulacrum of the deity or believers seems to respond to the general and 
cross-cultural worry of having transcendence presiding over the whole 
territory of the community and not only over its sancta sanctorum. Again, 
there is something paradoxical in this phenomenon. On the one hand, 
human groups need to concentrate the signs that refer to transcendence 
and represent it into a precise space, time, and, often, artifact. There could 
be no effective worshipping without the possibility of addressing the 
simulacrum of transcendence under these specific conditions, prescribed 
by the community’s grammar of infinity and liturgy.
On the other hand, however, concentrating the signs that relate to 
transcendence entails also feeding the anxiety that the non-sacred space 
might be deprived of the sancta sanctorum’s perfectly meaningful relation 
to infinity. That is the reason for which the representation of the deity 
must both be encircled and circulate. Infinitely various codes of circula-
tion stem from this common anthropological need, but they all seem to 
respond to a logic of cultural adaptation. In Christian processions, for 
example, human simulacra of transcendence (like those in medieval mys-
tery plays) were progressively expelled from liturgy exactly for the reason 
that their unpredictable agency could mar the extremely delicate process 
of having the simulacrum of transcendence leave its usual abode in order 
to venture into the world of religious meaninglessness. The journey of 
transcendence was essential so as to anoint profane space with the aura 
of a significant relation to infinity, and yet the actors’ individual agencies 
could constantly turn this journey of anointing into one of pollution: the 
sacred simulacrum might have been profaned through contact with the 
external world. When analyzing the evolution of cultural and religious 
forms in terms of adaptation, it is this kind of dynamic that matters the 
most. Semioticians and cultural analysts should point out the superior 
symbolical needs—dictated by a deep-seated religious or even ontologi-
cal ideology—in order to satisfy which semiotic alternatives compete, are 
selected, and successfully become tradition.
In the Catholic semiotic ideology, for instance—always struggling 
to balance the imperative of incarnation while avoiding idolatry—the 
semiotic habit of having wooden simulacra of transcendence, instead of 
human actors and actresses, circulating in the space of the community, 
was selected because of its suitability to the semiotic ideology of the com-
munity of believers. The difficulty of studying this cultural adaptation 
results from its explaining the survival of symbolical forms not in relation 
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to the extent to which they befit a natural environment but in relation to 
the extent to which they befit a cultural environment: that is, the abstract 
logic that impregnates all the semiotic processes of a semiosphere. The 
difficulty mainly consists in the fact that such abstract logic too is mutable, 
although usually so in the long period.
Semiotics of Incarnation
Fluctuations among alternative micro-varieties must be explained in rela-
tion to the extent to which they befit a superior frame of semiotic ideology, 
as suggested earlier. Long-term fluctuations among opposite semiotic 
ideologies, however, sometimes take place in revolutionary terms and 
cannot be explained according to the same logic. For instance, the fact that 
a community switches from a semiotic ideology in which the deity must 
not be represented through icons to one in which transcendence is given 
a body and a face not necessarily responds to an even higher and more 
abstract level of semiotic ideology, to a sort of semiotic meta-ideology. 
Generalizing this explicative model, indeed, means becoming prey of 
a recursive structure of reasoning, which ultimately fails to explain the 
causes of change.
On the opposite, one might surmise that a dialectic relation similar to 
that characterizing other human cultural trends, including that of popular 
fashion, underpins such radical ideological change. According to this dia-
lectic, that which ultimately motivates abandoning an iconoclastic religious 
tradition in order to embrace an iconic grammar of infinity is change itself. 
It is as though human communities, including religious communities, pe-
riodically needed to re-motivate their attachment to a semiotic ideology, to 
an abstract matrix of meaningful patterns. This matrix is usually invisible 
to believers and works exactly as spontaneous “second nature”. Believers 
receive existential quietude from endorsing such matrix with unques-
tioning spirit. As the inevitable pressure of micro-variations accumulate, 
however, believers start to perceive increasingly perspicuous cracks in the 
sky of religion. The fact of not bestowing a face upon divinity ceases to 
appear as unquestioned datum and starts manifesting itself as choice. The 
only way to re-motivate the collective habit and, therefore, reproduce its 
ability to save believers from uncertainty is to switch from the old matrix, 
which has ended up looking arbitrary, to the new one. That which matters 
in this new semiotic ideology, though, is not its intrinsic content but its 
relational content, that is, the fact that it opposes the previous semiotic 
ideology (Assmann 2008). Oscillation between opposite semiotic ideolo-
gies is one of the dynamics through which religious communities revive 
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their feeling of adhering not to an arbitrary grammar of infinity but to 
one that is motivated by truthful relation with transcendence. Given the 
framework provided by a certain semiotic ideology, then, fine-tuning of 
its patterns of signification takes place unceasingly.
To give an example, a religious community must decide whether to 
relate to an abstract simulacrum of transcendence or to have this simu-
lacrum incarnated into human-like forms, provided with real existence, 
personal agency, and intentional subjectivity. The switch between abstract 
deity and personal one or between non-incarnated and incarnated tran-
scendence must be explained in relation to its power of re-motivating the 
“second nature” of the religious community, whatever the final choice is. 
Once the framework of semiotic ideology is chosen, then, hierarchically 
less abstract forms of representations are progressively selected depend-
ing on how they befit the general framework. Christianity, for instance, 
re-motivates the “second nature” of the community by endorsing the 
semiotic ideology of incarnation against the abstractedness of the Jewish 
mainstream semiotic ideology. Once that this re-motivation has taken 
place, however, representations of Christ are selected and treasured as tra-
dition depending on whether they endanger or, on the contrary, fortify the 
general framework. Jesus is given a face, for instance, but it is nevertheless 
important that the features of this face are not simply those invented or 
re-created by humans but those shaped in conformity with a supernatural 
prototype (the mandylion, the holy shroud, etc.). The Catholic Church, 
therefore, endows itself with a whole juridical system, implemented by 
a technical and bureaucratic apparatus, meant to ascertain whether a 
painting, a book, a liturgy, as well as a saint, a miracle, or a relic conform 
with the prevailing “ideological model” of Catholicism or, on the contrary, 
dangerously deform it toward rival forms of re-motivation (Protestantism, 
Judaism, Islam, etc.).
Semiotics of Idolatry
In this theoretical model, idolatry consists in choosing the “wrong” frame-
work of semiotic ideology or in choosing unsuitable simulacra within the 
“right” framework (Keane 2007). As a result, one can distinguish between 
“external” and “internal” idolatry. In external idolatry, a religious com-
munity accuses another religious community of wrongly referring to 
transcendence. Accusations can be leveled both ways: between Judaism 
and Christianity, for instance, the former can accuse the latter of fetish-
ism because of its choosing of worshipping an incarnation of the deity, 
whereas the latter can accuse the former of not recognizing the definitive 
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simulacrum of transcendence, the only one that completely discloses its 
infinitude to the finitude of language and senses. In internal idolatry, 
forms of representation or signs of various kinds are judged as unsuitable 
in relation to the adopted framework of semiotic ideology. For instance, 
whereas relics of the incarnational simulacrum of the deity might be 
judged as appropriate, impersonating such incarnation might be judged 
as heresy, since it risks generating confusion between appropriate (deity 
into human) and inappropriate (human into deity) incarnations.
Conclusions
Tensions between different semiotic ideologies of religion are not accidents 
of history but, rather, the supreme dialectics through which communities 
of human beings motivate their blind endorsement of a second nature. 
Belief needs heresies, because the production of cultural forms escapes 
the selective mechanisms of natural adaptation. The only way in which 
a matrix of religious meaningfulness can survive as liturgy and tradition 
through history is to mark the frontiers that isolate it from idolatry. Ac-
cusations of idolatry can only be relational, as pointed out earlier. The 
same can be said for accusations of fetishism. Religious communities 
stigmatize other communities of believers or “heretical” members because 
they tend to fossilize transcendence into “wrong” simulacra, which are 
thought of as unrepresentative of infinitude. In this case too, it is only in 
relation to a crystallized second nature that simulacra can appear as more 
or less fetishist. That is common knowledge in the cultural anthropology of 
religion. That which is less obvious is that, again, accusations of fetishism 
are indispensable not only in order to define the frontiers of a religious 
community but also in order to naturalize the community’s contention to 
be able to single out the most meaningful patterns of infinity among the 
various available grammars (Eco 2011).
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